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RECENT CASES
LIMITATION

CONSTITUTIONAL

OF ACTIONS

DEPRIVATION

-

NATURE,

OF REMEDY.

VALIDITY,

CONSTRUCTION

The defendant,

-

UN-

a Connecticut

gun manufacturer, shipped a rifle to a Pennsylvania sporting goods store
in May, 1946, receiving payment for the sale on June 6, 1946. The plaintiff's cousin purchased the rifle and on July 3, 1950, loaned it to the plaintiff who lost an eye the same day due to the rifle's backfiring. Plaintiff
sued charging negligent manufacture. It was held that the Connecticut
statute of limitations ' for negligence actions barred the suit since the
statute required the action to be brought within one year after the negligent act or omission, and the negligence constituting the tort occurred
when the defective rifle was sold. Nor could the action be maintained
upon the basis of a breach of implied warranty, to which a six year
statute of limitations applied, because the Connecticut court requires
privity of contract between the parties to an action of that nature. A
strong dissent asserted that the cause of action did not accrue until
the injury, and that the statute of limitations could not have run before
the cause of action came into existence. - Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co.,
198 F.2d 821 (6th*Cir. 1952).
At common law there were no rules specifically directed at limiting
the time in which actions could be brought,3 but other rules to some extent imposed limitations. 4 Statutes of limitations are intended to preclude
litigation which would, because of lapse of time, produce unjust results.5
These statutes penalize prospective plaintiffs for sleeping on their rights. 6
Statutes of limitations may be "substantive" or "procedural". If they
are substantive, they usually go to the qualification of a statutory cause
of action.' In that event it is necessary to comply with the statutory time
requirement in order to receive the benefits of the cause of action. 8 On
the other hand, if the statute is a "pure" statute of limitations, it is one
1. Conn. Gen. Stat. §8324 (1949)
"No action to recover damages for injury to
the person, . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within one year from
the date of the act or omission complained of ....
(Italics supplied).
2. Dincber v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (6th Cir. 1952) "Except
in topsy-turvey land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be divorced before ever
you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house never built, or :niss
a train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has
always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute of limitations
does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of action exists ..
."
3. State Board of Adjustment v. State, 231 Ala. 520, 165 So. 761, 762 (1936)
"There was no such thing as a limitation of action at common law. The right is wholly
statutory ..
"; Hart v. Desnong, 1 Terry 218, 8 A.2d 85, 86 (Del. 1939) "At early
common law time constituted no bar to an action . . . Statutes of Limitations had their
origin in 1623 in the Statutes of 16 Jas. 1, ch. 16."
4. I Wood, Limitations 4 (2nd ed. 1893) "In the case of torts the maxim, 'actio
personalis moritur curi persona,' applied, and therefore were only limited by the duration
of the life of either party. The want of a limitation was supplied, in a measure, by
a doubtful doctrine of presumption, (presumption after twenty years that debt had been
paid) and also by the trial by wager of law, which is believed to have operated as a
check on stale demands." (parentheses added.)
5. Charles Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
6. Shunts v. Hirliman, 28 F.Supp. 478, 485 (S.D. Cal 1939) "The law should
aid the diligent, and not him who sleeps on his rights."
7. See Wilson v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 58 F.Supp. 844, 847 (E.D. Ark. 1945)
(noting and explaining the distinction); Ritter v. Franklin, 50 Cal.App.2d 844, 123
P.2d 866, 869 (1942)
"Those statutes which merely restrict a statutory or other right
do not come under this head (i.e., under the head of statutes of limitations), but rather
are conditions put by the law upon the right given."
8. State v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 138 Conn. 363, 84 A.2d 683 (1951);
see Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 1 A.2d 839, 842 (1938)
(Workmen's Compensation Statute).
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of repose affecting the remedy as distinguished from the right.0 The
statute of the forum usually applies to an action brought within its jurisdiction, even though the cause of action arose in another jurisdiction.1
However, where a statute of limitations of the place of the tort goes to
the substance of the action, the statute of the place of the tort controls and
compliance with it is a condition precedent to the right of action, while
non-compliance completely extinguishes the right of action." The Federal Court, in the instant case, was duty bound to interpret the unique
statute 1_ in the light of Connecticut decisions.'3
It is perhaps elementary that a tort based on negligence consists of
four elements: 14 (1) the duty, (2) the breach of duty, (3) the causal
connection and (4) the resultant damage. The second element is the "act
or omission",'5 while the first and second combined are often thought
of as the negligence.16 If the statute of limitations is thought of as applying to the time within which an action may be properly brought
from the date of the "act or omission" as these terms are used in the second element of the tort, a limit is in effect being imposed upon the time
within which an action may be brought after the negligence has occurred.
In other words, the statute restricts the period of proximate cause, the
third element of the tort, to the extent that if the damage, the fourth elemment of the tort,, occurs within the satutory period of limitations, the
person suffering the damage has a cause of action for which he has a
remedy. But if the damage does not occur within the statutory period,
the injured party has no recourse. This apparently was the manner in
which the statute was applied in the instant case.' 7
An application of this nature limits the time in which a judicial determination that a causal connection exists between act and injury will be
deemed proper. It lays down a rule that although the negligence proximately caused the damage, under the common law rule, if the time intervening between the negligence and the damage is greater than the statutory limit, the proximate cause is too remote and the action will not lie.
It restricts the common law standard for determining proximate cause.' 8

9. Empire Tractor Corp. v. Time, 10 F.R.D. 121, 122 (E.D. Pa. 1950). "A 'pure'
statute of limitations goes to the ability of the platintiff to enforce his right. A statute
of limitations provides a procedural limitation but does not deal with substantive rights!"
10. Thomas Iron Co. v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 131 Conn. 665, 42 A.2d 145, 146
(1945) "It is undisputed that, as a principle of universal application, remedies and modes
of procedure depend upon the lex fori.";Ley v. Simmons 249 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1952).

. 11. Lewis v. Reconstruction. Finance Corp., 177 F.2d 654, (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Thomas Iron Co. v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 131 Conn. 665, 42 A.2d 145, 146 (1945)
"The general rule . . . is subject to a well-recognized exception. . . . Where the 'foreign
remedy is so inseparable from the cause of action that it must be enforced to preserve
the integrity and character of the cause and when such remedy is practically available.'
• . . In such a case the lex loci . . . governs."
12. The language of statutes of limitations varies among the states, but most
provide that the statute shall begin to run from the time the cause of action accrued.
See Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1179.
13. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
14. Prosser, Torts 177 (1941).
15. Prosser, Torts 190 (1941).
16. Prosser, Torts 177 (1941).
17. See Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (6th Cir. 1952).
18. Cf. Di Gironimo v. American Seed Co., 96 F.Supp. 795, 797 (E.D.Pa. 1951);
White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 278, 18 A.2d 185, 187 (1941) "Causation . . . is like
a connecting bridge between the negligence and the harm that gives rise to the cause
of action. If the bridge be unbroken from negligence to harm, the right of action will
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There can be no question that such a limitation of the time of causal
connection could be properly imposed. No man has a vested right in a
common law rule of law entitling him to insist that it remain unchanged.19
However it should be realized that this statutory limitation would go to
a substantive element of the action, 20 that of proximate cause. That the
damage occur within the specified time after the negligence would then
be a condition precedent to the accrual of a cause of action, and an indispensable part of the action. This was not the purpose of the Connecticut
statute involved. Precedent establishes this statute as one of procedure
and remedial in nature. 2' To construe the statute as the Federal Court*
did here is to change it from one of procedural law to one of substantive
law in derogation of its previous construction by the Connecticut Court.
A statute of limitations may run from the time of the negligence, the
22
act or omission, but when this is true the legal injury must be present.
That is, the negligence and the resulting injury must have been, for all
practical purposes, simultaneous. The rule that requires the act or omission to include the legal injury or cause of action is not new. Although
the words in comparable old statutes were not indentical, they were of the
same import.23 No particular cause of action need be present to satisfy the
rule. Any existing legal injury whether based upon contract,2 4 trespass, 2 5
or negligence20 is sufficient. Connecticut had previously acknowledged
2
the merits of this rule. T
The very lack of privity of contract which precludes the plaintiff's
recovery under breach of warranty in contract, in the case under consideration,28 might have been decisive in allowing him to recover under
accrue when the injury is suffered. . . . Usually the. bridge is so short as to be crossed 'n
a matter of months or even for moments. But if the bridge be long and the passage slow,
these seems -to be no logical reason for saying that a right of action can accrue prior
to the injury. A long lapse of time may make difficult or even impossible proof that
the bridge of causation is unbroken, but if it appear on the balance of probabilities to be
intact, it will bear the necessary weight of conveying negligence to harm, so that the
two may merge into a cause of action. This appears to be the reasonable view to which
the authorities are now tending. . . . Otherwise, in extreme cases, a cause of action :night
be barred before liability arose."
19. See Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 I.
179, 106 N.E.2d 124,
130 (1952).
20. Accord White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d" 185, 186 (1941)
"Causation is thus more than a method of measuring damages; it is an element of the
cause of action."
21. Antinozzi v. D. V. Frione & Co., 137 Conn. 577, 79 A.2d 598 (1951);
Morris Plan Bank v. Richards, 131 Conn. 671, 42 A.2d 147, 148 (1945) "'The law of
the forum applies since statutes of limitations relate to the remedy.
; see Tuohey v.
Martiniak, 119 Conn. 500, 177 AtI. 721 (1935) (general history of statutes of limitation).
22. Miller v. Bean, 87 Cal. App.2d 186, 196 P.2d 596 (1948) (Statute did not
run against action for breach of covenant until damage resulted); see Blondeau v.
Sommer, 139 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Contra: Hooper v. Carr Lumber
Co., 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E.2d 818 (1939) (authority cited does not support the decision).
23. See, e.g., Gillon v. Boddington, 1 Car. & P. 540, 171 Eng. Rep. 1308, 1309
(1824) (act committed); Roberts v. Read, 16 East 215, 104 Eng. Rep. 1070, 1071
(1812) (fact committed).
24. See Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F.Supp. 478, 485 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
25. Houston Water-works Co.. v. Kennedy, 70 Tex. 233, 8 S.W. 36 (1888)
(defendant cut arch in plaintiff's house).
26. Powers v. Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 219 N.C. 254, 13 S.E.2d 431, 432
(1941) (negligent failure to warn that premises had been occupied by tubercular).
27. See Bank v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 323, 332, 335 (1857).
28. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d .821,, 822 (6th Cir. 1952) "Actions
for breach of implied warranties . . . may be brought only by . . . parties to the
contract ..
"

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

the applicable statute of limitations, The duty owed the plaintiff was
not imposed because of any special relationship between the parties, but
was a duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff as one of the mass
of human beings who inhabit the earth. One may be negligent toward
the whole world without legal liability until his negligence results in
legal injury.2 9 The gravamen of such an action is the injury which must
be present in order for the statute to run. On the other hand, if a contract relationship were present, the gravamen would be the breach, and
a cause of action would arise in the form of nominal damages for the
30
breach, in which event the statute would properly have run.
This appears to be the rule recognized by the Connecticut Court in the
case upon which the instant opinion places its reliance and cites as controlling, 3 1 but absent the initial legal injury at the time of the act or
omission, there are indications that the Connecticut Court wouHl find that
the statute would not run. 32 Connecticut has previously denounced a result such as that reached here, as divesting the plaintiff of his remedy before
his right to redress ever existed.23
It may well be, had the constitutional question been raised,34 that
the court would have reached a conclusion permitting a recovery in the
instant case. 35 The Connecticut Constitution guarantees each individual
his day in court for injury to his person, 3 6 while the Federal Constitution
assures persons that they shall not be deprived of property by any state
3
3
without due process of law. 1 It has been said that a claim for damages, 1
a right of action created solely by statute and not perfected by final
judgment,39 and the right to the benefit of a common law rule,4o are not
vested property rights. However it appears to be every where held that a
right of action or a cause of action 41 based upon common law, unadulterated

29. Prosser, Torts 178 (1941).

30. 1 Wood, Limitations 447 et seq. (2d ed. 1893) "In the case of torts
arising quasi e contractu, the statute usually commences to run from the date of the
tort, not from the occurrence of actual damage. . . . It is necessary that the wrongdoing
should be such that nominal damages may be immediately recovered."; see Note, 63
Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1200 (1950) "If the defendant's conduct in itself invades the
plaintiff's right, so that suit could be maintained regardless of damage-as with a breach
of contract and most intentional torts-the statute commences upon -completion of the
conduct."
31.
Cf. Kennedy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 135 Conn. 176, 62 A.2d 771
(1948)

(faulty

work

resulted

in

legal

damages

immediately).

32. See Bank v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324, 330 (1857).
33. Ibid. "If we are wrong, some strictly legal injuries might never for a moment
be capable of redress. . . . he might be barred of his remedy before his right to redress
"
ever vested ....
34. See Kenmike Theatre v. Moving Picture Operators, 139 Conn. 95, 90 A.2d
881, 884 (1952) "A constitutional question . . . should be lodged in the case at the
earliest moment . . . and must.thereafter be kept alive by appropriate steps; otherwise,
it will be waived."
35. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 81 F.2d 513, 517 (4th
Cir. 1936)

(courts

avoid interpretations which render

statutes unconstitutional).

36.
Conn. Const. Art 1, §12 "Every person, for an injury done him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law ....
37. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) "The
due process clause . . . requires that every man shall have the protection of his day
in court. ..
"
38. See Carson v. Gore-Meenan Co., 229 Fed. 765, 767 (D.Conn. 1916).
39. See Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d 961, 966 (1937).
40. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921) "No one has a vested
right in any particular rule of the common law. .. ."
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42
It
by statute, is a vested property right which the courts will recognize.
a
cause
had
plaintiff
the
whether
determine
to
therefore becomes important
of action which the Connecticut court would acknowledge as a constitutionally
protected property right.
43
it has
Through evolution of the common law standard of duty,
become generally recognized that the manufacturer of an inherently danger44
owes a duty to persons into whose
ous instrumentality, such as a rifle,
hands it might fall to make certain that the instrumentality is not defectively manufactured. This duty was breached when the gun here in45
The fact that the causal connecvolved was put upon the market.
tion was somewhat remote in time does not preclude recovery.46 When
the gun was fired and the injury sustained, the tort was complete, and
a common law cause of action arose, unless the Connecticut statute of limi47
tations prevented the action from accruing.

The Connecticut statute was exclusively procedural.48 It could have
no effect upon the creation of the plaintiff's cause of action which apparrently came into existence in Pennsylvania. Its only effect was to bar
the remedy for the cause of action in- Connecticut. At the time the gun
was fired and the injury suffered, a common law cause of action, which
4
ripened into a vested property right, " accrued to the plaintiff. A vested
property right requires a remedy in the courts of Connecticut in order
to satisfy the Connecticut 50 and Federal 51 Constitutions. The Connecticut statute of limitations, as interpreted in the instant decision, deprived
the plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed remedy. This interpretation gives the statute a force which raises grave doubts of its constitutionality.
EDWARD

E. DESSERT

41. "The right of action is merely the right to pursue a remedy. The cause of
action is the concurrence of the facts which give rise to an enforceable claim." United
States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 21 F.Supp, 645, 660 (S.D.Cal. (1937).
42. See, e.g., Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F.Supp. 576, 577 (N.D.Ill.
1935); Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d 961, 964 (1987); Siller v.
Siller, 112 Conn. 145, 151 At. 524, 525 (1930); Devlin v. Morse, 254 Mich. 113, 235
N.W. 812, 813 (1931) "A common law right of action is property, and as such is within
the rules of constitutional protection. (italics supplied).
43. Prosser, Torts 673 et seq. (1941); Restatement, Torts §395 (1934).
44. Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475, 478 (E.D. Mich. 1918)
(manufacturer liable without privity of contract).
45. See note 17 supra.
46. Prosser, Torts 349 (1941).
47. Cf. Morris Plan Bank v. Richards, 131 Conn. 671, 42 A.2d 147, 148 (1945)
"So far as appears, the plaintiff's cause . . . is a common-law action for fraud, in the
creation of which no statute is involved. Therefore the running of the New York statute
did not and could not terminate its existence but would only bar the remedy in
that state."
48. See note 21 supra.
49. See note 42 supra.
50. Siller v. Siller, 112 Conn. 145, 151 Ati. 524, 525 (1930) "The common-law
right of action for negligence . . . could not be taken away by retrospective legislative
action, for that would set the validating act above . . . the Constitution which guarantees
a remedy .... "; cf. Steward v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998, 999 (1928).
51. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921); cf. Devlin v. Morse, 254
Mich. 113, 235 N.W. 812 (1931); see Lindlots Realty Corp. v. Suffolk County, 251
App.Div. 340, 296 N.Y.S. 599, 607 (1937) (dictum that limitation which barred remedy
before it vested would be invalid); Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N.D. 1, 8, 81 N.W. 72,
75 (1899) (application of statute of limitations to pre-existing right).

